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FEDERALISM AND CONSPIRACY: IS
GOVERNMENTALLY COMPELLED CONDUCT
PER SE LAWFUL UNDER § 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT?
MARK D. ANDERSON*
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act establish a national policy favoring
competition.' This policy is often at odds with the desires of state and local
governments to intervene in markets to achieve regulatory goals. The tension
between the national policy favoring competition and the state and local
policies favoring regulation raises a federalism concern about the respective
roles of national, state, and local governments. This concern has been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in a series of cases balancing the national in-
terest in competition with state and local interests by establishing immunity
for certain state and local government acts.' The Supreme Court has recently
disturbed that balance in a case purporting to resolve an antitrust issue
unrelated to immunity or federalism.
3
Part I of this article will discuss the structure of immunity for acts of
states, political entities subordinate to states, and individuals acting under
governmental authority. Part II will set forth the Supreme Court's recently
© 1987 Mark D. Anderson
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1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 4-51. The tension referred to in the text was also ad-
dressed by Congress in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, which limits the remedy
available against local governments and persons directed by such governments to injunctive
relief. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. III 1985).
3. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
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adopted position that conduct compelled by a government cannot violate sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act because such conduct does not satisfy the statute's
concerted action requirement. Part III will demonstrate that the Supreme
Court's position with respect to the concerted or unilateral nature of govern-
mentally compelled conduct is contrary to the reasons the concerted action
requirement was placed in the statute. Part IV will then analyze the impact of the
Supreme Court's erroneous position regarding concerted action on the
federalism balance achieved in the immunity cases.
I. Immunity for Acts of States, Their Subordinate Political Entities, and
Individuals Acting Under Governmental Authority
Origins of Immunity-Acts of States
The Supreme Court created the doctrine of state action immunity to the
antitrust laws in Parker v. Brown." In that case a producer and packer of
raisins challenged a program established pursuant to California law that
restricted sales of raisins. California law allowed the creation of proration
programs to restrict competition among agricultural producers and, thereby,
raise the price of their products. 5 Such a program was created for the 1940
raisin crop. Under the proration program, producers were allowed to sell
only 30 percent of their crop through ordinary commercial channels. 6 The re-
maining 70 percent of the crop was placed in pools subject to sale by pro-
gram administrators. The plaintiff claimed that the proration program was
invalid under section 1 of the Sherman Act as an illegal restraint of trade.
7
The plaintiff's claim forced the Court to face a knotty problem created by
our dual system of government. In the Sherman Act, the national government
expressed a preference for free and open competition. However, states fre-
quently restrict competition in order to achieve some other policy objective.
When the preference stated in the Sherman Act for competition conflicts
with a state law limitation on competition, the Court must resolve this con-
flict. One possible resolution would be to simply state that under the
supremacy clause state laws are rendered invalid by conflicting federal laws, 8
and then determine whether the challenged state law conflicts with the Sher-
4. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5. Id. at 346.
6. Id. at 348. Even as to their 30 percent, producers were required to obtain certificates
authorizing saleE. This certification requirement was designed to control the timing of sales. Id.
7. A similar program organized by private parties would be per se illegal as price fixing.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.").
8. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance th.reof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2.
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man Act prohibitions on agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade9 and
actual or attempted monopolization.' 0 In Parker v. Brown the Supreme
Court rejected this approach. Instead it held that the actions of states are im-
mune from attack under the Sherman Act. In doing so, it was interpreting
the Act as not applying to state action, thus avoiding the application of the
supremacy clause.
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never intended
to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It
derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
of the state and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command. We find nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was
to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activity directed by
its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed pur-
pose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress."
The Court's approach was obviously motivated by a concern for the rights
of sovereign states in our federal system of government.' 2 The Court was
willing to grant blanket immunity without regard to how anticompetitive the
state conduct was. Under Parker v. Brown, immunity does not depend upon
the application of Sherman Act policy, but rather the subordination of that
policy to federalism concerns. Recognition that the controlling policy is
based on the unique position occupied by states in the federal constitutional
structure was important when the im-nunity established in Parker v. Brown
was extended to subordinate political entities'
3 and individuals.' 4
Because the blanket immunity established in Parker v. Brown applies only
to actions of the state as sovereign, one must distinguish such action from
acts of subordinate political entities and individuals. The Supreme Court
faced this issued in Hoover v. Ronwin.15 In that case the plaintiff failed the
Arizona bar examination.' 6 He sued four members of the Arizona Supreme
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
10. Id. § 2.
11. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
12. For a comparison of the Parker v. Brown Court's unwillingness to invalidate state
economic regulation on antitrust grounds with the Court's unwillingness to overturn such regula-
tion on substantive due process grounds, see Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum,
61 B.U.L. REV. 1099, 1104-07 (1981); Note, Antitrust Immunity: The State of "State Action,"
88 W. VA. L. REV. 783, 788 (1986).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 21-30.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 31-51.
15. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
16. Id. at 564.
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Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions (the Committee) under
section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that they had conspired to reduce com-
petition by excluding competent bar applicants from the practice of law. The
defendants argued that even if the plaintiff's allegations were true, their ac-
tions were immune under Parker v. Brown. The Court held that legislative
actions of the state supreme court were sovereign acts of the state and, thus,
would qualify for the immunity established in Parker v. Brown. " Because ac-
tion by the Committee would not be sovereign state action, the crucial issue
was whether the plaintiff was denied bar admission by the state supreme
court or by the Committee. A denial by the court would qualify as immune
state action under Parker v. Brown, while a denial by the Committee would
not. 8
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
was denied admission to the bar by action of the state supreme court. 9
Justice Powell concluded that the Committee merely recommended can-
didates for admission by the court and that the court retained the final
authority to grant or deny admission.2 0 Thus, it was the court's denial of ad-
mission that injured the plaintiff, and the court's action was immune under
Parker v. Brown.
In summary, action by a state as sovereign is immune from attack under
the Sherman Act. This immunity is based upon the independent constitu-
tional role of states in our dual system of government. Additional complexity
arises when immunity is claimed by subordinate political entities or in-
dividuals acting under governmental authority, neither of which have
sovereign constitutional status.
Immunity for Subordinate Political Entities
The extension of the immunity created in Parker v. Brown for states to
counties, municipalities, state agencies, and other subordinate political en-
tities troubled the Supreme Court for some time.2' The Court in Parker v.
Brown ruled that pro-competitive policies expressed in the Sherman Act were
subordinate to the sovereign acts of states. It did not hold that the Sherman
Act must yield to any act by any government.2 2 Given the large number of
17. Id. at 568 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
18. Action by a committee established by a state supreme court might qualify for immunity
as action of a subordinate political entity (see infra text accompanying notes 21-30), or of in-
dividuals acting pursuant to governmental authority (see infra text accompanying notes 31-51).
19. 466 U.S. at 573.
20. Id. at 576-79.
21. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
22. The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody in the
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure
of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limita-
tion: Ours is a "dual system of government," Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis
added), which has no place for sovereign cities.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982).
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actions by subordinate political entities that regulate or otherwise affect
markets, the issue of whether and under what circumstances such entities
qualify for immunity from attack under the Sherman Act is of great impor-
tance.
The Court resolved many of the complexities created by the extension of
immunity to subordinate political entities in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire.2 In that case four townships located adjacent to Eau Claire, Wiscon-
sin, alleged that Eau Claire violated the Sherman Act by monopolizing
sewage treatment services and tying those services to sewage collection ser-
vices." Eau Claire denied sewage treatment services to the plaintiff townships
and would supply such services to individuals in the townships only if their
property was annexed to Eau Claire." Eau Claire asserted that it was entitled
to immunity under Parker v. Brown.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Powell, the Court recognized that
municipalities were not automatically entitled to immunity because, unlike
states, municipalities have no constitutionally sovereign status." Thus, if a
municipality is to qualify for immunity under Parker v. Brown, that immun-
ity must be derived from the state's constitutional status. The Court held that
in order for a municipality to obtain immunity, its actions must be "taken
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace competition ... with
regulation."" The Court rejected the plaintiff's assertions that a municipal-
ity must also demonstrate that the state compelled it to act or that the state
actively supervised its conduct. 28 Eau Claire's action passed the "clearly ar-
ticulated state policy" test because state statutes authorized the challenged
conduct. 29 Thus, a subordinate political entity may inherit immunity under
Parker v. Brown from the state so long as its actions are taken pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy to replace competition with regulation.
3 0
Immunity for Individuals Acting Under Governmental Authority
Immunity for acts of states and subordinate political entities would be of
little practical significance if the governmental bodies were immune but
private individuals acting with or under the authority of those bodies were
not. Governmental policies would be frustrated if individuals acting pursuant
to those policies were liable under the Sherman Act. Thus, some form of im-
munity for individuals acting under governmental authority is necessary if
the immunity established in Parker v. Brown is to have meaningful effect.
23. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
24. Id. at 36.
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 38 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412
(1978) (Brennan, J.)).
27. 471 U.S. at 44.
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id.
30. In a footnote in Town of Hallie the Court suggested that state agencies would be treated
in the same manner as municipalities. Id. at 46 n.10.
1987]
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The rationale behind Parker v. Brown, however, does not require that the
states be given the power to license violations of federal law. States cannot
grant immunity to individuals merely by stating that their conduct is legal.
The immunity created in Parker v. Brown is a limited exception to a gen-
erally applicable federal statute and is designed to allow states to carry out
regulatory policies. Thus, immunity for individuals must be broad enough to
allow the immune regulatory acts of governmental entities to have mean-
ingful effect. It must be narrow enough, however, to allow the Sherman Act
to reach anticompetitive individual conduct that is not needed to effect
governmental policies.
The Court created a standard to meet these demands in Southern Motor
Carrier Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States .3 In that case the defendant
rate bureaus were private organizations composed of motor common car-
riers. The rate bureaus submitted proposals for rates to state public service
commissions. If a commission took no action, the rate became effective after
a stated time period. Alternatively, a commission could hold a hearing to
consider the rate and expressly approve or disapprove the proposal. State
statutes allowed, but did not compel, common carriers to act together
through the rate bureaus to submit rate proposals. The United States alleged
that rate bureaus violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by fixing transporta-
tion rates.32 The rate bureaus argued that their actions were immune under
Parker v. Brown .
33
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court applied a two-pronged test to
determine when individuals qualify for immunity under Parker v. Brown .1
The first prong of the test asks "whether the ... challenged conduct was
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy." 35 The second prong of
the test asks whether the individual conduct is actively supervised by the
government .36 If the challenged conduct is taken pursuant to a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy and is actively supervised by the government, it is im-
mune. The United States conceded that the second prong of the test was met,
that is, that the rate bureaus' activities were actively supervised by the public
service commissions." The application of the first prong, however, raised an
31. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id. The rate bureaus also argued that their conduct was immune under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine derived from Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This doctrine
immunizes collective solicitation of action by governments. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTI.
TRUST LAW DEVEt.OPMENTS 613-19 (2d ed. 1984). The Court, however, did not address this issue.
See 471 U.S. at 53 n.ll.
34. This test was drawn from California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
35. 471 U.S. at 62. This prong of the test set forth in the text is the same as the test estab-
lished by Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985), for immunity for subor-
dinate political entities. The Town of Hatlie test has no second prong.
36. 471 U.S. at 57.
37. Id. at 66.
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issue of law and an issue of fact regarding whether the rate bureaus' collec-
tive rate-making activities were pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
The issue of law was whether individual conduct that was permitted but
not required by the state could qualify for immunity. The Court rejected any
compulsion requirement and held that conduct permitted by a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy satisfied the first prong of the test?8 The Court rea-
soned that a compulsion requirement would reduce the regulatory options
available to states and cause states to intrude more severely in markets by re-
quiring rather than permitting individual conduct.3 9
The issue of fact was whether all of the relevant states had clearly ar-
ticulated a policy allowing collective rate making. Statutes in three of the
four states expressly permitted collective rate making. 0 Mississippi's
legislature had not adopted such a statute." While the Mississippi Public Ser-
vice Commission permitted collective rate making, Commission action was
not enough, standing alone, to satisfy the first prong of the test. The test re-
quires a clear articulation of policy by the state acting as sovereign. Action
by a state agency is not sufficient.42 The Court held, however, that because
the Mississippi legislature directed the Commission to regulate rates, the first
prong of the test was satisfied. The test is whether "the State's intent to
establish an anticompetitive regulatory program is clear,' 3  and the
Mississippi legislature's action satisfied that test.
In Southern Motor Carrier Rate Conference, the Court faced the first
prong of the two-prong test for individual immunity and concluded that the
challenged conduct was taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
The Court recently faced the second prong of the individual immunity test,
that is, whether challenged individual conduct was actively supervised by the
government. In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy," a liquor retailer challenged the
resale price maintenance provisions of New York's liquor control law. New
York required liquor wholesalers to file, or post, each month schedules con-
taining both case and bottle prices.4 - A liquor retailer was required to charge
at least 112 percent of the bottle price posted by the wholesaler at the time of
the retailer's sale. 6 The actual retail markup required, however, may exceed
38. Id. at 61. In Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. 34, the Court rejected a compulsion requirement
for municipalities claiming immunity.
39. 471 U.S. at 61.
40. Id. at 65.
41. Id.
42. Parker immunity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken pur-
suant to a clearly articulated policy of the State itself, such as a policy approved by
a state legislature, see New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96, 99 S.Ct. 403, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978), or a state supreme court, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).
Id. at 63.
43. Id. at 65.
44. 107 S.Ct. 720 (1987).




12 percent for several reasons. First, most retailers buy by the case and the
posted case price on a per-bottle basis may be less than the posted bottle
price.47 Second, the posted bottle price may have increased since the retailer
purchased the liquor. Thus, while New York law required liquor retailers to
charge at least 112 percent of the posted bottle price, it did not fix any ratio
between retail and wholesale prices.
The 324 Liquor Corporation argued that the New York statute resulted in
resale price maintenance. Resale price maintenance is per se illegal under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.48 New York argued that its statutes were immune
from antitrust scrutiny under Parker v. Brown and its progeny. In another
opinion by Justice Powell, the Court applied the two-prong test and rejected
the defendant's immunity argument." The Court recognized that the first
prong of the test was met. The challenged conduct was taken pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy." The Court held, however, that the second
prong of the test was not satisfied. The state did not actively supervise the
conduct .5 The state merely authorized and enforced the resale price
maintenance: without further involvement. The Court held that such a grant
of authority did not constitute active supervision.
In summary, it is more difficult for an individual to qualify for immunity
under Parker v. Brown than either a state or a subordinate political entity. A
state action is automatically immune so long as it is the state as sovereign
that is acting. A subordinate political entity qualifies for immunity if it is act-
ing pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. An individual is granted im-
munity, however, only if his action is taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy and is actively supervised by the government.
II. The Supreme Court's Application of the Conspiracy Requirement to
Governmentally Compelled Conduct
Because section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade, the threshold issue in any
section 1 case is the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy. 2
The Act distinguishes unilateral from concerted behavior and subjects only
concerted behavior to section 1.5" Governmental conduct, like private con-
duct, does riot violate section 1 unless it is part of a contract, combination,
or conspiracy.
47. For cases containing forty-eight or fewer bottles, the posted case price must be at least
$1.92 less than the sum of the posted bottle prices of the bottles in the case. Id.
48. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
49. Justice Powell also authored the opinions of the Court in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558 (1984), Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985), and Southern Motor Car-
rier Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
50. 107 S.Ct. at 725.
51. Id. at 726.
52. If such a contract, combination, or conspiracy is established, the conduct is illegal only if
it unreasonably restrains trade. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
53. Unilateral conduct may be illegal under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1982), which prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization.
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The Supreme Court addressed the concerted action requirement of section
1 in the context of governmental conduct in Fisher v. City of Berkeley. 4 In
that case the electorate of the city of Berkeley enacted a rent control or-
dinance by the initiative process." The ordinance placed ceilings on the rents
most residential landlords could charge. These ceilings could be raised by a
Rent Stabilization Board in an annual general adjustment or upon a petition
from an individual landlord. 6 A group of landlords challenged the ordinance
in state court, arguing, among other things, that the ordinance was un-
constitutional because it was preempted by the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, held that the or-
dinance was not preempted by section 1 of the Sherman Act because there
was no conflict between the ordinance and the Act. The Court ruled that the
rent control activities mandated by the ordinance did not involve concerted
action. In the absence of concerted action, section 1 was not violated. The
ordinance was not preempted because it did not conflict with federal law.
In holding that the rent control activities under the ordinance did not in-
volve concerted action, the Court rejected two possible combinations asserted
by the landlords. 7 First, the Court rejected the landlords' argument that the
rent control ordinance created a combination between the city and each
landlord who complied with the rent ceilings. In doing so, the Court relied
upon the governmental authority of one of the parties to the alleged com-
bination to order compliance by the other party. 8 The Court also rejected
the landlords' argument that the rent ceilings resulted in a horizontal com-
bination among the landlords.5 9 The Court distinguished cases in which a
governmental authority allowed other persons to act together. In such cases
the collaboration of the nongovernmental entities constituted concerted ac-
tion in the Court's view.
60
54. 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
55. Id. at 1047.
56. Id.
57. In addition to the two scenarios discussed in the text, the Court declined to address a
third. The Court noted that the landlords did not claim that the manner of enactment caused the
conflict with section 1. Id. at 1048. Presumably, the Court was referring to the possibility that
the initiative process of enactment by vote of the electorate resulted in a combination sufficient
for section 1. If such an argument prevailed, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see supra note 33)
might protect such a combination. See Churchwell, The Federal Implications of Local Rent Con-
trol: A Plaintiff's Primer, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 919, 930-36 (1985).
58. A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become concerted action
within the meaning of the statute simply because it has a coercive effect upon par-
ties who must obey the law. The ordinary relationship between the government and
those who must obey its regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is not
enough to establish a conspiracy.
106 S.Ct. at 1049-50.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1050-51. The Court cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384 (1951), as examples of such "hybrid restraints." In both of those cases, state law allowed
suppliers to engage in resale price maintenance. The Court viewed the participation of the sup-
1987]
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
Because the Court held that no concerted action was present and, thus,
section 1 was not violated, it did not address the possibility that the or-
dinance was immune under Parker v. Brown and its progeny. 6' Such immuni-
ty is required only if the conduct would otherwise violate the Sherman Act.
The Court's approach troubled Justice Powell, who concurred in the judg-
ment. Justice Powell authored the opinion of the Court in all four of the re-
cent immunity decisions discussed above.62 In his view, the validity of the
Berkeley rent control ordinance could most appropriately be addressed on
immunity grounds. 63 He agreed with the Court's judgment upholding the or-
dinance because he believed it qualified for immunity under Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau- Claire.64 As discussed above, 5 that case provides immunity
for actions of municipalities taken pursuant to an affirmatively expressed
and clearly articulated state policy. Justice Powell found such a policy in the
action of the California legislature approving an earlier rent control or-
dinance enacted in the city of Berkeley. 66 Because he would resolve the case
on the basis of immunity, Justice Powell did not need to address the con-
spiracy issue faced by the majority.
Justice Brennan dissented. He viewed the ordinance as having the same ef-
fect as a price-fixing agreement by landlords. 67 The concerted action issue
was, in his opinion, controlled by California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.6 and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.6
9
In those cases the state allowed suppliers to fix the resale price charged by
distributors.70 Justice Brennan saw no relevant distinction between those
cases in which the state allowed two firms to fix a price and this case where
plier and the restrained distributors to be sufficient to establish concerted action. The Court
recently found such a hybrid restraint involving governmentally approved resale price
maintenance in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S.Ct. 720, 724 n.8 (1987).
61. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
62. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S.Ct. 720 (1987); Southern Motor Carrier Rate
Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S.
34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
63. 106 S.Ct. at 1051.
64. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
66. 106 S.Ct. at 1052-53. See also Lopatka, The State of State Action: Antitrust Immunity:
A Progress Report, 46 LA. L. REV. 941, 1030-32 (1986).
67. 106 S.Ct. at 1054. The Court had accepted a similar characterization. Id. at 1049. The
characterization of the rent control ordinance as the analytical equivalent of a price-fixing agree-
ment by landlords is mistaken. The landlords have no incentive to conspire to hold rents down.
A more appropriate characterization of the rent control ordinance would be as a purchaser's
cartel composed of tenants attempting to hold rents down. In any cartel there is an incentive to
cheat on the cartel price. In this cartel cheating would take the form of a tenant obtaining a
desirable apartment by offering the landlord more than the price fixed by the purchaser cartel.
The rent control ordinance makes such cheating more difficult by making it illegal. The or-
dinance thus makes the city and each landlord part of the tenants' price-fixing conspiracy.
68. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
69. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
70. See supra note 60.
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the city fixed the price to be charged by the landlord."' He viewed the Court's
holding that the city did not enter into a combination with the landlords by
telling them what to charge as a mere conclusory statement unsupported by
authority or analysis.7 2 Finally, disagreeing with Justice Powell, 73 Justice
Brennan found that the ordinance did not qualify for immunity because of a
lack of an affirmatively expressed state policy granting authority for such an
ordinance.
74
III. Governmentally Compelled Conduct is Concerted
The Reasons for Subjecting Concerted Action to Scrutiny Under Section 1
Apply to Governmentally Compelled Conduct
The distinction established by the Sherman Act between unilateral and
concerted behavior subjects the two categories of conduct to different stan-
dards of legality. Unilateral conduct is subject only to section 2 of the Act
and is illegal if it constitutes monopolization or attempted monopolization.1
5
Concerted behavior is subject to section 1 of the Act,", and it is illegal if it
creates an unreasonable restraint on trade.7 The reasonableness of a restraint
depends upon its impact on competition.7 8 This impact may be measured
under the Rule of Reason by assessing the pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects of the restraint.7 Alternatively, unreasonableness is con-
clusively presumed if the restraint falls in an established per se illegal
category. 0 Thus, the Sherman Act subjects concerted conduct to the
71. 106 S.Ct. at 1054-56.
72. Id. at 1055.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
74. 106 S.Ct. at 1056-57.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
76. Concerted behavior could also violate section 2 if it created or attempted an illegal
monopoly. Id. Further, section 2 states that it is illegal for anyone to "combine or conspire with
any other person or persons to monopolize." Id. Presumably, such a combination or conspiracy
would also violate section 1.
77. Although section I on its face appears to prohibit every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade, the Supreme Court long ago interpreted the statute as applying only
to unreasonable restraints.
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
78. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("Con-
trary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor
of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on
the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.").
79. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98-120 (1984).
80. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are certain
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heightened scrutiny of section 1 while declaring unilateral behavior to be
lawful unless it achieves or attempts a monopoly.
The threshold nature of the concerted action requirement of section 1 has
two important aspects. First, it limits judicial antitrust review of unilateral
conduct to the relatively infrequent cases of actual or attempted monopoliza-
tion.' This limitation forces competitors concerned about the unilateral ac-
tions of their rivals to wage their battles in the marketplace rather than the
antitrust courtroom. This is so even though some may not survive.12 Second,
because the concerted action requirement is only a threshold, it is not, by
itself, a test of illegality. Concerted action is illegal under section 1 only if it
violates the Rule of Reason or a per se rule. 3 The concerted action require-
ment merely defines a category of conduct to which the Rule of Reason and
per se rules will be applied. It does not separate lawful from unlawful con-
duct.
A mistake in the definition or application of the concerted action require-
ment will impair the goals of the statute in one of these two aspects. If
unilateral action is mistakenly characterized as concerted, judicial interven-
tion will be allowed when the statute directs that it should not.8 4 If concerted
conduct is mistakenly characterized as unilateral, the conduct will be held to
be lawful when the statute demands that the Rule of Reason and per se rules
be applied to determine the legality of the conduct. Obviously, the correct
analysis of the concerted action requirement is essential to achieving the goals
of the statute.
The Supreme Court considered the special role of the concerted action re-
quirement in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp."5 In that case,
the jury found that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary had
conspired in violation of section 1.86 The Supreme Court held that a parent
corporation is incapable of conspiring with a wholly owned subsidiary under
section 1.87 In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the reasons that
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.").
Categories of per se illegal conduct include price fixing among competitors, United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); resale price restrictions imposed by a supplier
upon a distributor, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); market division by com-
petitors, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); boycotts by competitors, Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); and tying agreements, Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
81. Unilateral conduct may also constitute unfair competition under state or federal law.
82. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) ("The anti-
trust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors,' Brown
Shoe Co. v. Unted States, 370 U.S. at 320.") (emphasis in original).
83. Most concerted action does not violate section 1. Every contract constitutes concerted ac-
tion, but very few contracts violate section 1.
84. Such intervention would assess the reasonableness of the conduct.
85. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
86. Id. at 757-58.
87. Id. at 777.
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concerted action is more dangerous than unilateral action and, thus, is treated
more harshly by the Sherman Act.
[Concerted action] deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.
In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued
their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their
common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in
which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the
economic power moving in one particular direction.18
Thus, concerted action increases competitive risk because of three
characteristics. First, it eliminates independent centers of decision making.
Second, it causes the actors to act as one rather than pursue their own
separate interests. Third, it aims economic power in one direction. While
each of these three characteristics is linked to the others, they may be used
cumulatively to define the concerted action requirement. If challenged con-
duct has all three of these characteristics, it is concerted for purposes of sec-
tion 1.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in City of Berkeley-that when a govern-
ment compels a person to act, the government's act and the compelled per-
son's response does not constitute concerted action"'-must be measured
against this definition. 90 Under the rent control ordinance challenged in City
of Berkeley, the city issues a command to each landlord specifying the rent
the landlord may charge, and the landlord is required to comply. The Court
held that the combination of the city's command followed by the landlord's
unwilling compliance does not constitute concerted action. 9' The Court's
only explanation for this conclusion is that one of the actors is a governmen-
tal unit operating with force of law. 92 While the governmental nature of one
of the participants may be relevant to the application of Parker v. Brown and
its progeny,93 it is irrelevant to the application of the concerted action re-
quirement. The tripartite definition of concerted action drawn from Cop-
perweld mandates the conclusion that the Court erred in City of Berkeley
when it held that governmentally compelled conduct is not concerted. 94
88. Id. at 768-69.
89. See supra text accompanying note 58.
90. For a critique of lower court cases prior to City of Berkeley finding no concerted action
between governments and persons compelled to act by such governments, see Note, Preemption
of Anticompetitive State Statutes by Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Is an Agreement Required?,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1985). Although it is clear that the author of the note believes that
those cases are wrongly decided, it is unclear whether his reason for this conclusion is that agree-
ment analysis should be abandoned in this context, that concerted action exists among the com-
pelled persons, or that concerted action exists between the compelling government and each com-
pelled person. See id. at 260-64.
91. 106 S.Ct. at 1049-50.
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 4-51.
94. But cf. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 VAND.
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Governmentally compelled conduct has all of the characteristics of con-
certed conduct set forth in Copperweld.9 First, governmentally compelled
conduct eliminates the compelled party as an independent center of decision
making. The Berkeley rent control ordinance takes the decision about what
rent to charge away from the landlord. Second, when a governmental unit
compels someone to act in a specified manner, the governmental unit and the
compelled party act as one to fulfill the governmental interest, and the com-
pelled party is prevented from pursuing his own separate interest. The city of
Berkeley and the compelled landlord act as one to fulfill the city's low-rent
objective and the landlord is prevented from pursuing his own interest in
higher rents. Third, governmentally compelled conduct aims economic power
in the one direction desired by the governmental unit. The Berkeley rent con-
trol ordinance prevents the economic power of each landlord and each tenant
from being expressed in diverse directions in the market and aims economic
power in the direction desired by the city. 96 Governmentally compelled con-
duct has each of the characteristics that makes concerted conduct more
dangerous than unilateral conduct. Therefore, it should be treated as con-
certed conduct for purposes of section 1.9"
The Vertical Agreement Cases Do Not Require That Governmentally
Compelled Conduct be Treated as Unilateral
In 1984 the Supreme Court addressed the concerted action requirement as
applied to compelled conduct in the context of vertical restrictions on distri-
bution. In dicta, the Court concluded that in limited circumstances compelled
conduct in that context is not concerted. The Court based this conclusion on
a controversial case decided in 1919. The Court's conclusion in its 1984 dicta
does not control in the context of governmentally compelled conduct.
A vertical restriction on distribution occurs when a supplier limits what its
distributor may do with the product sold by the supplier to the distributor."8
The restrict:ion may specify the price the distributor must charge when it
resells the product. Such a restriction is usually referred to as resale price
L. REv. 1257, 1231 (1986), where the author accepts without criticism the Court's conclusion in
City of Berkeley that governmentally compelled conduct is not concerted.
95. But cf. 6 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 39-59 (1986), where Professor Areeda concludes
that not all coerced conduct should be considerd conspiratorial.
96. The ordinance obviously prevents the economic power of landlords from being expressed
in higher rents. However, the ordinance also prevents tenants who can afford higher rents from
obtaining desirable apartments by offering to pay more. The allocation of desirable apartments
must be made on some nonprice basis.
97. Obviously, the conclusion set forth in the text does not mean that all governmentally
compelled conduct is illegal under section 1. Governmentally compelled conduct, like all con-
certed action, will usually be lawful under section 1 because neither the Rule of Reason nor any
of the per se rules will be violated. Further, governmentally compelled conduct will be immune
from attack undcr section 1 under some circumstances under Parker v. Brown and its progeny.
98. A vertical restraint results from concerted action between parties at different levels of the
distribution chain. It is distinguished from a horizontal restraint, which results from concerted
action between competitors.
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maintenance (RPM). Alternatively, the restriction may affect some nonprice
aspect of resale such as where or to whom the distributor may resell.
The application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to vertical restrictions on
distribution involves two controversial issues. The first is whether vertical
restrictions on distribution should be subject to the Rule of Reason or be per
se illegal. Presently, RPM is per se illegal, 99 while nonprice vertical restric-
tions are subject to the Rule of Reason.100 Whether RPM should continue to
be per se illegal is hotly debated.' 0' The second controversial issue raised by
the application of section 1 to vertical restrictions on distribution is determin-
ing when supplier and distributor conduct is concerted. Conduct by a sup-
plier and a distributor is subject to section 1 only if it is concerted.
The Supreme Court faced the concerted action issue and avoided the issue
of whether RPM should continue to be per se illegal in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp. 102 Spray-Rite was a distributor of herbicides that it
purchased from Monsanto. After Monsanto terminated Spray-Rite as a
distributor, Spray-Rite sued under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 03 The jury
found that the termination "was pursuant to a conspiracy between Monsanto
and one or more of its distributors to set resale prices.'' 14 The trial court in-
structed the jury that such an RPM conspiracy is per se illegal.0 5 On appeal
two issues were presented to the Supreme Court: first, whether there was suf-
ficient evidence to support the jury's finding of an RPM conspiracy, and sec-
ond, whether RPM should be per se illegal.
The Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief arguing that the Court
should overturn the per se rule against RPM.' 6 It argued that the economic
effects of RPM and nonprice vertical restrictions were the same and they
should both be judged by the Rule of Reason." 7 The Court, in a footnote,
declined to overturn the per se rule against RPM because neither party had
challenged the rule below or on appeal. 0 8
99. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
100. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
101. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280-98 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 247-72 (1985); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 147-66; Anderson, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail
Prices-The Case for Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1979); Baxter, Vertical
Practices-Half Slave, Half Free, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 743 (1983); Calvani & Berg, Resale Price
Maintenance After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War With Itself, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1163; Easter-
brook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Scherer,
The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983).
102. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
103. Id. at 757.
104. Id. at 757-58.
105. Id. at 757.
106. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 19-29, Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 456 U.S. 752 (1984).
107. Id., Brief at 21-22.
108. The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other amici suggest that we take
this opportunity to reconsider whether "contract[s], combination[s] . . .or con-
spirac[ies]" to fix resale prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the
19871
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The Court addressed at length the basis for the jury's finding of concerted
action. Spray-Rite alleged that Monsanto engaged in an RPM conspiracy
with other distributors and that Monsanto terminated Spray-Rite because it
refused to keep prices up. The Supreme Court held that the cumulative
weight of four pieces of evidence supported the jury's finding of an RPM
conspiracy between Monsanto and other distributors. 09 In dicta, the Court
rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that evidence of complaints to
Monsanto about Spray-Rite's low prices by other distributors would, stand-
ing alone, support the jury's RPM finding."' Courts of appeals had
disagreed about whether an RPM finding could be supported by evidence
that a low price distributor was terminated in response to complaints by
other distributors."' The dicta in this case resolved the conflict.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's refusal to abolish the per se rule against
RPM or in its rejection of distributor complaints as a sufficient basis for an
RPM finding affects the analysis of the concerted nature of compelled con-
duct set forth in the previous section." ' However, in explaining its conclu-
sion about the sufficiency of evidence of distributor complaints, the Court
resurrected a doctrine that characterizes compelled conduct as unilateral in
some circumstances. The Court asserted that if evidence that a supplier term-
inated a distributor in response to price-related complaints from other
economic effect of resale price maintenance is little different from agreements on
nonprice restrictions. They say that the economic objections to resale price
maintenance . . .- such as that it facilitates horizontal cartels-can be met easily
in the context of rule-of-reason analysis.
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argu-
ment. This case was tried on per se instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in
the District Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing
conspiracy, nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this Court
presse; the argument advanced by amici. We therefore decline to reach the ques-
tion, and we decide the case in the context in which it was decided below and
argued here.
465 U.S. at 761 n.7 (citations omitted).
109. The Court relied upon the following four pieces of evidence. First, Spray-Rite's low
prices had been the object of complaints by other Monsanto distributors. Second, Monsanto
threatened to withhold adequate supplies of a new corn herbicide from the price-cutting
distributors if they did not raise prices. Third, a threatened distributor assured Monsanto that it
would raise prices. Fourth, a distributor had written a newsletter which the Court found could
reasonably be interpreted as referring to an understanding that distributors would maintain
prices and Monsanto would terminate price-cutting distributors. Id. at 764-66.
110. Id. at 764.
111. The court below recognized that its standard was in conflict with that articulated
in Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. Other circuit courts also have
rejected the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted the Seventh Circuit's
standard. One panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also has
adopted that standard, while another appears to have rejected it in an opinion
issued the same day.
Id. at 759 n.5 (citations omitted).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 75-97.
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distributors was held to be sufficient to support an inference of an RPM con-
spiracy, two important doctrines would be threatened. First, the distinction
between per se treatment for RPM and Rule of Reason treatment for non-
price vertical restraints could be eroded." 3 A set of nonprice restrictions
might give rise to price-related complaints by distributors who believed low-
price competitors were not abiding by the nonprice restriction. If such price-
related complaints transformed the nonprice vertical restrictions into RPM,
the distinction between the two types of restraints would be threatened. In re-
jecting the sufficiency of distributor complaint evidence, the Court also
sought to preserve the Colgate doctrine. This doctrine characterizes some
compelled conduct as unilateral in the context of vertical restrictions on
distribution.
In United States v. Colgate & Co.," the Court affirmed the judgment of
the district court dismissing an indictment charging RPM. In doing so, it
stated what has become known as the Colgate doctrine.
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the cir-
cumstances under which he will refuse to sell." 5
The basis for the Court's conclusion seemed to be that under such cir-
cumstances no concerted action would be present. Obviously, if a supplier
may lawfully coerce compliance with RPM by announcing in advance that it
will refuse to deal with noncomplying distributors, the per se rule against
RPM would be substantially weakened.
The Colgate doctrine has been subject to great debate and controversy con-
cerning its meaning and validity in both cases"' and commentary.'
113. 465 U.S. at 761-64.
114. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
115. Id. at 307.
116. See, e.g. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United
States v. Schrader & Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
117. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 9, REFUSAL TO DEAL AND EX-
CLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIPS (1983); Anderson, Vertical Agreements Under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act: Results in Search of Reasons, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 905 (1985); Campbell & Ware,
Russell Stover and the Vertical Agreement Puzzle, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1983); Fulda, In-
dividual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 509 (1965); Kilburn, Other Vertical Problems: Pricing, Refusals to Deal,
Distribution, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (1982); Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban
on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 258; Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine
Dead?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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However, for present purposes it is sufficient to recognize that in Monsanto
the Court resurrected the doctrine in its most extreme form.
A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse
to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independ-
ently. Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale
prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to
comply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufac-
turer's demand in order to avoid termination.118
The revival of a pristine form of the Colgate doctrine in Monsanto was a
startling development for three reasons. First, the Colgate doctrine had been
subject to uncertainty and qualification almost since its inception.3 9 For
several decades preceding Monsanto, its practical vitality had been in serious
doubt. 120 Second, the conduct protected by the Colgate doctrine has all three
of the characteristics of concerted action set forth in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp. 12' The Colgate doctrine allows a supplier to coerce
distributor compliance with RPM because the doctrine mistakenly
characterizes the parties' conduct as unilateral. The conduct of the coercing
supplier and the coerced distributor has all of the characteristics contained in
the Copperweld Court's description of concerted action 2 : the supplier's suc-
cessful coercion eliminates the distributor as an independent center of deci-
sion making; the distributor does not pursue his own interest separately but is
coerced into acting for the benefit of the supplier; and economic power is
now aimed in the direction desired by the supplier. Thus, the Colgate doc-
trine is at odds with the analysis of concerted action set forth in Copperweld,
a case decided in the same term as Monsanto.'
23
The third reason that the revival of the Colgate doctrine in Monsanto was
surprising is that it creates an anomalous disparity of treatment between two
types of RPM. RPM protected by the Colgate doctrine is per se lawful
because that doctrine states that no concerted action is present. All other
RPM is per se illegal. 2 Thus, a supplier may lawfully coerce compliance
with RPM by announcing that distributors who do not comply will be term-
inated. A supplier violates section 1, however, by asking for and receiving an
assurance that a distributor will comply.25 The Court did not explain in
Monsanto why coerced compliance with RPM under the Colgate scenario
118. 465 U.S. at 761 (citations omitted).
119. See Levi, supra note 117.
120. See Jnited States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); George W. Warner & Co.
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
121. 467 1J.S. 752, 768-69 (1984).
122. See supra text accompanying note 88.
123. For an argument that a test for concerted action based upon the dependence of the par-
ties' conduct way be drawn from Copperweld and that the Colgate doctrine violates such a
dependence-bas.-d test, see Anderson, supra note 117, at 927-30, 937-38.
124. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
125. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.9.
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should be automatically lawful when assured compliance with RPM is illegal
per se.
While the Monsanto Court's resurrection of the Colgate doctrine is dif-
ficult to explain, the Court was not adopting the general proposition that
compelled conduct is unilateral. Even the extreme form of the Colgate doc-
trine stated in Monsanto is limited to cases involving vertical restrictions on
distribution. It does not apply to other vertical cases.' 6 Further, the doctrine
does not apply in the horizontal context.'"7 Thus, outside the context of ver-
tical restrictions on distribution the Colgate doctrine does not operate and
compelled conduct remains concerted.'
2 8
Even within the context of vertical restrictions on distribution, the Colgate
doctrine does not characterize all compelled conduct as unilateral. If a sup-
plier goes beyond merely announcing and following a policy of refusing to
deal with noncomplying distributors, concerted action may be found. If the
supplier coerces the distributor into giving an assurance of compliance, con-
certed action is present.'29 Even under the Colgate doctrine, the fact that the
assurance was coerced does not make it unilateral.
In summary, the Court in Monsanto, without explanation, resurrected the
Colgate doctrine. This doctrine characterizes some compelled conduct in the
context of vertical restrictions on distribution as unilateral. However, the
doctrine is limited to the context of vertical restrictions on distribution and
even within that context does not characterize all compelled conduct as
unilateral. Thus, Monsanto does not alter the conclusion set forth above that
governmentally compelled conduct is concerted.' 3
IV. The Supreme Court's Erroneous Characterization of Governmentally
Compelled Conduct as Unilateral Disrupts the Balance of National and State
Interests Struck by the Immunity Cases
In the immunity cases discussed above,' the Court struck a balance be-
tween the national interest in competition expressed in the Sherman Act and
state interests in regulatory policies. This balance is rooted in concerns about
federalism and the constitutional status of states. The balance results in the
sovereign acts of states being automatically immune,'32 the acts of subor-
126. For example, a tying agreement is not viewed as unilateral even though the supplier
coerces the purchaser into buying both the tying and tied products by announcing a policy of
only selling the products together.
127. A cartel which results from one competitor coercing a second competitor into following
the first competitor's price is not lawful unilateral action.
128. For one possible explanation of why the Court in Monsanto was willing to adopt the
Colgate doctrine for vertical restrictions on distribution, see Anderson, supra note 117, at
940-42.
129. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.9.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 4-51.
132. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See
also supra text accompanying notes 4-20.
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dinate political entities being immune if pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy,' 33 and the acts of individuals acting pursuant to governmental
authority being immune if taken pursuant to such a state policy and actively
supervised by the government.' 34 Obviously this pattern of immunity leaves
the acts of subordinate political entities subject to the federal antitrust laws if
they are not taken pursuant to the requisite state policy and the acts of in-
dividuals subject to such federal laws if the required state policy or govern-
mental supervision is absent.
The Court's erroneous holding in City of Berkeley disrupts the balance
between concerns about competition and federalism struck in the immunity
cases by shielding all governmentally compelled conduct from scrutiny under
section 1.13 1 When the Court mistakenly treats governmentally compelled
conduct as unilateral, it declares it lawful under section 1. 3' As discussed
above, 31 this conclusion is counter to the analysis of the concerted action re-
quirement set forth in Copperweld. Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion
the Court relies upon the governmental nature of one of the parties.'3 The
immunity cases, however, declare the governmental character of the par-
ticipants to be insufficient to shield the conduct from antitrust review unless
the conditions of immunity are satisfied. If such conditions are not satisfied,
that is, where there is no clearly articulated state policy, or in the case of in-
dividual conduct, where governmental supervision is absent, the immunity
cases direct that the antitrust laws be applied. 39 The Court's holding in City
of Berkeley destroys this structure for the application of state and federal law
when it uses the governmental nature of one of the parties to shield govern-
mentally compelled conduct from scrutiny under section 1. Thus, in City of
Berkeley the Court turned its back on both the analysis of the concerted ac-
tion requirement set forth in Copperweld and the balance of state and na-
tional interests achieved in the immunity cases.
Conclusion
In City of Berkeley the Supreme Court held that a municipality and an in-
dividual do not act in a concerted manner when the municipality tells the in-
133. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). See also supra text accom-
panying notes 21-30.
134. See Soutlhern Motor Carrier Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). See
also supra text accompanying notes 31-51.
135. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045, 1056 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also Gifford, supra note 94, where the author argues that such disruption constitutes an im-
provement.
136. It is, of course, possible that conduct which is deemed to be unilateral may violate sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act if it constitutes actual or attempted monopolization.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 75-97.
138. See supra text accompanying note 58.
139. It is, of course, possible that concerted conduct by governments that is not immune will
be judged by antitrust standards different from the Rule of Reason and the per se rule developed
for private business behavior. See Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40, 56 n.20 (1982).
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dividual what to do and the individual complies because of fear of prosecu-
tion. This holding is contrary to the Court's 1984 analysis of the concerted
action requirement set forth in Copperweld. Because the Court's conclusion
in City of Berkeley is based upon the governmental nature of one of the par-
ties, it also disturbs the balance of the national government's interest in com-
petition and the states' interest in regulation attained in the immunity cases.
